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NEPA - The Next Twenty Years
Thomas France*
INTRODUCTION

It is undoubtedly a fool's errand to predict how the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) might interact, legally and politically, with the development of environmental policy during the next 20
years. To understand the folly of such an exercise, one need only imagine undertaking a similar assignment twenty years ago, just after
Congress passed, and President Richard Nixon signed, what has become our most pervasive federal environmental statute. Who could
have, or would have, foreseen the cottage industry that has grown up
around environmental impact statement preparation, the evolution of
agency-wide regulations through the Council on Environmental Quality, or the vast body of environmental common law that the federal
courts have developed in interpreting NEPA?
Having thus established my credentials for offering a view of how
NEPA might evolve during the next two decades, the only serious way
that I can approach this project is to view the future course of NEPA
not as someone detached from this voyage, but rather as an advocate
for stronger environmental protection and better environmental
decision-making within the federal bureaucratic establishment. The
legal meaning of NEPA will certainly change over the next twenty
years; but it should, and indeed must, change in ways that both promote and force federal actions that protect and enhance the country's
environment.
While the twentieth anniversary of NEPA's passage is an appropriate point at which to take stock of NEPA's accomplishments and to
measure its failures, two recent Supreme Court cases dealing with
NEPA give added impetus to undertaking such an assessment now.
In Marsh v. Oregon NaturalResources Council1 and especially Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,2 the Court put to rest, at least
*Director, National Wildlife Federation, Northern Rockies Natural Resource
Center. J.D. 1981, University of Montana.
1. 109 S. Ct. 1851 (1989).
2. 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989).
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least for the foreseeable future, any hope that the judiciary might force
substantive environmental responsibilities on federal agencies. While
the holdings in Marsh and Methow Valley were fully consistent with
earlier Supreme Court NEPA decisions,' both cases gave the Court an
opportunity to rethink its application of NEPA against factual backdrops that argued strongly for judicial intervention. Given past precedent, however, the fact that the Court continued to insist that "NEPA
itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process' should surprise no one.
But the Court's decisions do perhaps indicate that NEPA has
reached an important divide. Absent new direction from Congress, the
continuing admonitions from the Supreme Court that NEPA is ultimately a procedural statute will eventually, if they have not already,
sap the statute of much of its vitality as a vehicle for better protection
of the human environment. Alternatively, if NEPA is to attain its full
potential for protecting the environment, the unmistakable message
from the Supreme Court is that the statute must be changed. The future,
it would seem, holds two clear choices.

II. WHERE NEPA HAS BEEN
While the public promise of the National Environmental Policy Act
has always been that its proper implementation will protect the nation's
environment, the reality has always been otherwise. From the very
outset of NEPA's enactment, the federal courts have recognized that
NEPA is a procedural statute, the main purpose of which is to integrate environmental considerations into the other decision-making
criteria used by federal agencies. Better environmental quality is but
a byproduct of this process.
Judge Skelly Wright's 1971 opinion in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission is one of
the earliest judicial interpretations of NEPA' It is still cited by environmental litigants, the courts and the law schools for its careful articulation of NEPA's broad environmental purposes.' Often quoted are such
forceful statements as: "NEPA, first of all, makes environmental pro-7
tection a part of the mandate of every federal agency and department";
and "[tihe sweep of NEPA is extraordinarily broad, compelling consideration of any and all types of environmental impact of federal
action.""
Despite the pronouncements found in Calvert Cliffs' about the long
reach and overriding intent of NEPA, the court noted the limited mech3. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978);
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
4. Methow Valley, 109 S. Ct. at 1846.
5. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
6. See, e.g., J. BATTLE, ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING AND NEPA 115-22 (1986).
7. Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1112.
8. Id. at 1122.
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anism contained in the law for realizing the goals of the statute. Judge
Wright wrote:
We conclude, then, that section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process and
creates judicially enforceable duties. The reviewing courts probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under
Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs
and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values.'
There is little that separates this observation by the venerated
author of one of the foremost NEPA opinions from the recently offered
dicta of Justice Stevens in Methow Valley: "If the adverse environmental
effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated,
the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values
outweigh the environmental costs." 10
While twenty years and hundreds of NEPA opinions separate Judge
Wright from Justice Stevens, both men concluded that Congress never
intended to tip the decision-making balance in favor of the environment, but only to better integrate environmental considerations into
the decision-making process. Wright noted that "Congress did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal; rather it desired
a reordering of priorities, so that environmental costs and benefits will
assume their proper place along with other considerations."'" Stevens
in turn relied on statements from Senators Jackson and Muskie to reinforce the view that while NEPA forcefully articulated a national
environmental policy, agency implementation of this policy would come
solely through the careful consideration of environmental values. 2
The continuing emphasis on achieving NEPA's policy goals through
a rigorous procedural process has led to a number of results. First, most
federal agencies do give greater consideration to environmental values
now than they did twenty years ago. The combination of the law itself,
the ongoing vigilance of environmental plaintiffs, and the insistence
of the federal courts on a rigorous application of NEPA's procedures
has led to the achievement of at least this aspect of NEPA's purpose.
Second, when citizens, environmental lawyers and the federal courts
have confronted proposed federal actions with serious environmental
consequences, they have, despite their inability to stop such projects,
extracted from federal agencies the full measure of compliance with
NEPA's procedural duties. The environmental impact statements prepared on controversial or destructive projects have been carefully
scrutinized and often rejected for their failures to adequately consider
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 1115.
109 S.Ct. at 1846.
Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1112.
Methow Valley, 109 S.Ct. at 1846.
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such disparate subjects as cumulative environmental impacts," worst
case scenarios, 4 or an adequate range of project alternatives and newly
available information.15 Even where lawsuits over the adequacy of EISs
have been unsuccessful, the sheer volume of litigation has served as
a constant reminder of NEPA's presence to the federal bureaucracy.'
Similarly, agency declarations that their actions would not significantly
impact the environment have also been carefully reviewed and regularly challenged, both successfully and unsuccessfully, all across the
county.' 7
Finally the ongoing inquisition into agency NEPA procedures has
resulted in the production of ever more elaborate NEPA documents
and ever more emphasis on process, as the policy goals of the statute
go unrealized. While federal agencies give greater attention to identifying the environmental effects of their projects through the EIS
process, this "action forcing""' component of NEPA has not achieved
the promise of consistently sound environmental decisionmaking. Federal agencies again and again provide documentation of significant
environmental impacts while choosing to accept such impacts in the
implementation of all manner of projects and actions.
Methow Valley illustrated this salient reality. Despite Justice
Stevens' hope that the combination of the "strong precatory language
of section 101 of the Act and the requirement that agencies prepare
detailed impact statements" would "inevitably bring pressure to bear
on agencies to 'respond to the needs of environmental quality' ",1 the
Forest Service issued a decision authorizing the development of a major
ski area in a rural mountain valley in north central Washington.
Predicted impacts from this development included a substantial reduction of the area's 30,000 head mule deer herd and a degradation of air
quality violative of state air quality standards." Despite "the pressure"
brought to bear by these disclosures, the Forest Service approved the
project while the mitigation of these negative impacts remained uncertain.' The Supreme Court held that the EIS prepared on the project
adequately disclosed these impacts and that the Forest Service had the
discretion to move forward with the project even in the absence of a
finalized mitigation plan.
13. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1983).
15. Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
16. According to Carlson, NEPA and the Conservation of BiologicalDiversity, 18
ENVTL. L. 15, 35 n.109 (1986), no less than 839 NEPA challenges were filed in the federal courts in the years 1977, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. The courts found
either EAs or EISs inadequate in 381 of these cases. Id.
17. See, e.g., Foundation for N. Am. Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681
F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982); Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
18. 115 Cong. Rec. 40,416 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson); see also S. Rep.
No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
19. Methow Valley, 109 S. Ct. at 1845 (quoting from 115 Cong. Rec. 40,425 (1969)
(remarks of Sen. Muskie)).
20. Methow Valley, 109 S. Ct. at 1841.
21. Id. at 1842.
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The lesson of Methow Valley is not that Supreme Court interpreted
NEPA in a manner consistent with its earlier precedent, but that the
Forest Service clearly failed to meet the policy goals of NEPA. It can
hardly be argued that the Forest Service used "all practicable means"
to act as a "trustee of the environment" or to "maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and [a] variety of
individual choice." 22 While the environmental wisdom of approving the
ski area itself can certainly be debated, approving it prior to implementing adequate mitigation measures cannot. Under other statutes and
regulations, the Forest Service had the discretion to withhold issuance
of the special use permit for the project. If the goals of NEPA were to
be fully achieved, the Forest Service, at a minimum, was obligated to
exercise this discretion in a manner that made full mitigation a reality rather than a subject of speculation.
Other recent cases also provide evidence that the policy goals of
NEPA are far from being achieved. While many NEPA cases present
difficult facts and tough decisions, others involve a relatively clear choice
between environmental protection and marginally necessary economic
development. All too often, federal decisionmakers from a whole spectrum of federal agencies spurn NEPA's aims in favor of traditional
courses of action. In Maine, for example, the Corps of Engineers and
the Federal Highway Administration approved a new shipping facility on an undeveloped island even though there was no need for the
facility until after the turn of the century. In Oregon, the Bureau of
Land Management insisted on additional old growth timber harvest
even while the northern spotted owl, a species dependent on old growth
habitat, had been proposed for listing under the Endangered Species
Act. 24 In Mississippi, the Corps of Engineers continues to destroy bottomland hardwood forests and wetlands through its channelization work
even though the country has identified a national priority of protection of such areas. 2' And the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
is still approving hydroelectric projects without adequate consideration of environmental values. 26 The list could go on.

III. WHERE NEPA MIGHT Go
As we look to the future it seems indisputable that, for better or
worse, NEPA will continue to be the chief tool of citizens seeking to
protect the environment. While statutes such as the Clean Water Act,"
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(1), (4) (1982).
23. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 714 F. Supp. 539 (D. Me. 1989); see also Sierra Club
v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989).
24. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456 (D. Or. 1989).
25. Mississippi, ex. rel. Moore v. Marsh, 710 F. Supp. 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
26. LaFlamme v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm., 842 F.2d. 1063 (9th Cir. 1988).
27. While NEPA has primarily been the tool of environmental groups and citizens
threatened with unacceptable development, development interests have used and will
continue to use NEPA and the courts to frustrate certain federal actions. See American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
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the Endangered Species Act2 9 and the Federal Strip Mine Act3" surely
provide more by way of substantive environmental protection, NEPA,
for all its limitations, is the only federal statute that reaches across
the entire range of federal agencies and activities and touches almost
every federal project that threatens the environment. Given this reach,
both local activists and national environmental organizations will continue to allege violations of NEPA in their efforts to limit, change and
control federal projects with unacceptable impacts.
Since environmentalists can only turn to NEPA in many instances,
the disputes between federal agencies and their critics over what constitutes compliance with the law will undoubtedly continue. Agencies
will prepare ever more elaborate environmental impact statements and
environmental assessments in an effort to satisfy the close scrutiny
of potential plaintiffs and the courts, while conservation organizations
can be expected to exploit every facet of NEPA. Each side will try to
capitalize on any legal breakthroughs that occur. In this context, it
will be interesting to observe the ingenuity of both lawyers and the
courts in trying to further expand NEPA's common law.
It is clear that some areas of NEPA will be more heavily litigated
than others in the coming years. Suits over the adequacy of environmental impact statements, difficult enough to sustain in the past, will
be even tougher to win in the future as result of the Supreme Court's
holdings in Methow Valley and Marsh. The long odds against a successful EIS challenge will likely lead to fewer such cases being filed,
although there will certainly be instances where plaintiffs feel compelled to press forward despite daunting case precedent. The NEPA
lawsuits that are filed will no doubt focus on those issues of adequacy
that have proved fruitful in the past: whether the potential for cumulative impacts was properly evaluated,3" whether the EIS was readable
and understandable, 2 or whether the environmental document was
properly tied to other agency NEPA reviews.
It also seems that there is room for the development of additional
precedent in the areas of mitigation and worst case analysis. While
the Supreme Court held that binding mitigation was not required by
NEPA in Methow Valley, the Court went to considerable lengths to
stress that a thorough discussion of mitigation was a necessary part
of any environmental review. Justice Brennan highlighted this proposition in his concurring opinion.3 4 The exact dimensions of this requirement have still not been fully explored by either environmental litigants or the courts. Similarly, while the Supreme Court in Methow Val29. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988).
30. 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1982 & Supp. V. 1987).
31. See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); Save the Yaak Comm.

v. Block, 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. Oregon Envt'l Council v. Kunzman, 614 F. Supp. 657 (D. Or. 1985).
33. Methow Valley, 109 S. Ct. at 1847.
34. Id. at 1851 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ley refused to require the Forest Service to prepare a "worst case analysis" on the impacts of the ski area, the Court endorsed new Council
on Environmental Quality regulations that require federal agencies
to evaluate the potential for environmental harm from future events
that are "reasonably foreseeable. '35 Given the human-caused disasters
that the experts said would never happen, such as the Exxon Valdez
oil spill or the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor episode, there is obviously a great deal of room for argument about what events are "reasonably foreseeable." Federal agencies will limit their analysis of such events
at their peril.
It is also likely that EISs will be challenged for failing to adequately
evaluate a proposed project's impacts which relate to emerging environmental concerns. Future EISs will surely be called upon to consider
how a timber sale might impact biological diversity"6 or how a new
power plant will contribute to acid rain. Certainly programmatic documents, such as the Forest Service's 1990 Resource Planning Act (RPA)
assessment must consider how the agency's timber program on a nationwide basis is contributing to an international problem such as global
warming. Since plaintiffs' attorneys and the environmentally concerned
public generally move much faster than the federal bureaucracy, it can
almost be assumed that such issues will be brought into the courts before
the agencies are prepared to honestly deal with them.
The failure of federal agencies to prepare EISs and the adequacy
of environmental assessments and findings of no significant impact will
certainly remain the most fruitful arena of NEPA litigation for plaintiffs. That federal agencies even attempt to use EAs for many controversial projects is a source of wonderment to many environmental litigators, but despite continued whippings in court, the federal bureaucracy
shows little sign of abandoning this procedural shortcut. Such recent
cases as Save the Yaak Committee v. Block37 and State of Mississippi
Ex. Rel. Moore v. Marsh38 demonstrate the ongoing willingness of the
federal courts to reject EAs and to require EISs for federal actions that
"may" significantly affect the environment."
35. Id. at 1849. See also, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1988).
36. For a an excellent discussion of how NEPA can be used to evaluate biological
diversity, see Carlson, NEPA and the Conservation of Biological Diversity, 19 ENVTL.
L. 15 (1988).
37. 840 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. 710 F. Supp. 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1989).
39. In the Ninth Circuit, the judicial standard for determining whether an EIS
is required is whether:
[t]he plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, show that the proposed project
may signficiantly degrade some human environmental factor. (citations
omitted) A determination that significant effects on the human environment will in fact occur is not essential. (citations omitted). If substantial
questions are raised whether a project may have a significant effect on
the human environment, an EIS must be prepared.
Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Department of Agriculture, 681
F.2d 1172, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1990

7

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 25 [1990], Iss. 1, Art. 10

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXV

While all manner of NEPA claims will continue to be filed in the
future, both conservation advocates and federal officials recognize the
fundamental dichotomy between the goals of any NEPA lawsuit and
the relief that the courts can grant. Suits are filed to prevent environmental harm from occurring, but the courts can only order more studies
and better documentation of environmental impacts. Despite the limited
benefits to anyone of such relief, and after Methow Valley and Marsh
the limited possibilities for achieving it, bad environmental decisions
will force more NEPA lawsuits which, in turn, will force federal agencies into ever more elaborate efforts at procedural compliance with the
law.
Given this rather bleak future, the time has clearly come to change
the basic premise of NEPA. In 1969, as the country began to more seriously examine its environmental problems, it was probably appropriate to enact a procedural statute that only required the consideration
of environmental values. But in 1989, a host of environmental problems
remain unsolved. As we face the continuing destruction of environmental resources and identify new concerns that were unimagined just
twenty years ago, it is time to amend NEPA to provide for substantive
environmental protections. If the country is to progress towards a better environmental future, federal agencies cannot be allowed to continue approving actions that result in environmental harm.
At least three possible ways of amending NEPA suggest themselves.
While statutory change cannot totally prevent the federal establishment from moving forward with ill-advised projects, the selection of
any one of the following alternatives would be an important step forward in securing better environmental protection.
The constant admonitions from the federal courts that NEPA is a
procedural and not a substantive statute indicate that perhaps the most
obvious way to achieve NEPA's goals would be to develop a substantive component that would amend section 102(C)4 ° to require the
development of a project alternative that maximizes environmental protection and enhances environmental values. In addition, the amendment would require the selection of this alternative absent a record
of decision which justifies another course of action.
By amending NEPA to create a rebuttable presumption that federal agencies will develop and follow an environmentally preferred
course of action, there would still be discretion as to the exact dimensions of this course, and the ability to depart from it should circumstances warrant. At the same time, it would be far more difficult for
agencies to justify decisions which negatively impact the environment,
and it would be far easier for both the public and the courts to insist
on the full measure of environmental protection.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982).
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A second, and less extreme way to amend NEPA would be to res-

tructure section 102(C)(ii) 41 to require the agency to identify measures

necessary to mitigate and compensate for unavoidable adverse environmental effects and then to mandate that such measures be included
in the final project design. This change in the law would allow federal
agencies more flexibility in their chosen course of action but would force
better internalization of environmental costs into project design. The
concepts of mitigation and compensation are already familiar to many
federal agencies involved in private and public water projects, and have
worked particularly well in the Pacific Northwest since the enactment
of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act.42 Finally, under such a proposal, the Supreme Court could no longer
no duty to "mitigate the adverse
hold that federal agencies are under
43
effects of major federal actions.

A final possibility for amending NEPA would be to develop a binding consultation process between the agency proposing the action and
an agency with environmental expertise such as the Environmental
Protection Agency or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. While
experience with the consultation provisions of the Endangered Species
Act44 teaches that consulting agencies are extremely reluctant to
directly challenge the "action" agency, the process of consultation often
results in significant and beneficial modifications of project design. 4While the limitations of NEPA have long been recognized by those
familiar with the law, there have been no serious efforts to amend the
statute since its enactment 20 years ago. Instead Congress and the
small host of other environenvironmental community have focused on a 46
47
mental initiatives ranging from Superfund, to forest management,
to clean water, 4 and beyond. In creating a comprehensive body of
environmental law, revisiting NEPA has perhaps not been an important legislative priority.
But at least some of the inertia in the NEPA field comes from a
sense that there is more to be lost than gained in amending the statute because forces opposed to sound environmental policies and sound
environmental decisions would outmaneuver the proponents. There are
at least two responses to this view. First, neither Congress nor the
American people have shown any inclination to retreat on issues of
environmental policy over the last two decades. Many statutes have
been enacted or reauthorized during this period, and while the odd provision may have been weakened, the overall record shows a steady
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
of 1980,
47.
48.

Id. § 4332 (CXii).
16 U.S.C. § 837.
Methow Valley, 109 U.S. at 1847.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
See, e.g., Friends of Endangered Species v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
The National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (1988).
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982).
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strengthening of our environmental laws, often by overwhelming congressional margins. For example, Congress reauthorized the Endangered Species Act by a near unanimous margin in 1988, and the Clean
Water Act sailed through both House and Senate at the beginning of
the 100th Congress. The apparent lesson is not that it won't be difficult
to strengthen NEPA in a manner suggested above, but that there seems
little likelihood that Congress will weaken or eliminate the principal
elements of the law.
Second, the dicta from the courts and the remedies available under
NEPA, indicate that there is little to be gained on behalf of the environment by simply holding the line with the present law. The principal
goal of the environmental movement cannot be more detailed, more
complex impact statements, which are the only obvious results of NEPA
litigation. The goal must be to build on the accomplishments and
experiences of the past twenty years and to recognize that while NEPA
is a vitally important statute in its present format, and while it has
forced the federal establishment to take into account environmental
values, it must change to meet the environmental needs of the future.
This change must encompass, in some fashion, substantive environmental protection.49

49. In a move that caught most conservationists by surprise, the U.S. House of
Representatives quietly approved a series of amendments to NEPA during the fall of
1989. Under H.R. 1113, NEPA's EIS provisions would be changed in two important
ways. First, federal agencies would be required to develop alternatives to the proposed
action which would achieve similar public purposes but which would avoid adverse
environmental impacts. Second, agencies would be required to implement mitigation
and monitoring measures identified through the EIS process. At this writing, no similar legislation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate.
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